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OTC derivatives: 
ﬁ  nancial stability challenges 
and responses from authorities
The importance of well-functioning over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets for ﬁ  nancial stability was 
highlighted during the ﬁ  nancial market turmoil, when signiﬁ  cant shortcomings in risk management and 
market transparency were exposed. In response to these experiences, public authorities have launched 
a series of measures to strengthen OTC derivatives markets. This article provides an overview of this work. 
It explains the signiﬁ  cance of well-functioning OTC derivatives markets and discusses the main lessons 
from the ﬁ  nancial crisis regarding the need to strengthen their resiliency and transparency. Then, we 
describe the main tools under consideration, relating to the use of sound market infrastructures – central 
counterparties and trade repositories –, enhanced bilateral risk management as well as to cooperation 
between regulators and overseers of infrastructures and banking supervisors. We ﬁ  nally describe the state 
of play of the main initiatives within these areas.
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he importance of well-functioning 
over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets 
for ﬁ  nancial stability was highlighted during 
the financial market turmoil, when significant 
shortcomings in risk management and market 
transparency were exposed. In response to these 
experiences, public authorities have launched 
a series of measures to strengthen OTC derivatives 
markets. This article provides an overview of 
this work. Section 1 explains the signiﬁ  cance of 
well-functioning OTC derivatives markets, while 
section 2 discusses the main lessons from the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis regarding the need to strengthen their 
resiliency and transparency. Section 3 describes the 
main tools under consideration, relating to the use 
of sound market infrastructures, enhanced bilateral 
risk management as well as to cooperation between 
regulators and overseers of infrastructures and 
banking supervisors. Section 4 describes the state 
of play of the main initiatives within these areas. 
1| THE IMPORTANT ROLE 
  OF OTC DERIVATIVES MARKETS
Derivatives have an important function for the 
economy and the ﬁ  nancial system. On the one hand, 
derivatives can have a welfare improving effect. In 
particular, they can contribute to enhanced risk 
management, e.g. by redistributing risks to those 
market participants who are most willing and able 
to deal with them, by enabling the transfer of the 
economic risks of assets without the transfer of 
the legal rights and obligations pertaining to the 
underlying assets, and by facilitating the targeted 
hedging of risk exposures. Derivatives can also 
broaden investment opportunities by enabling 
participation in ﬁ  nancial markets with only small 
ﬁ  nancial investments and at higher speed and lower 
transactions costs than for direct investments in 
the underlying. Finally, they can support overall 
market efﬁ  ciency by exploiting price differences 
between derivatives and cash markets. On the other 
hand, however, derivatives may also be a source of 
systemic risk. For instance, they enable the increased 
leveraging of market participant’s portfolios and 
may, in case that the resulting exposures are not 
matched by appropriate risk management, imply 
higher net risks for the ﬁ  nancial system. Given that 
derivatives are largely traded between major ﬁ  nancial 
institutions through bilateral contracts, they can 
also raise contagion risk in the ﬁ  nancial sector, with 
potential ﬁ  nancial stability implications. Finally, by 
taking advantage of arbitrage opportunities between 
ﬁ  nancial markets, they also render the stability of 
these markets much more interdependent.
Derivatives that are traded OTC have some 
characteristics that make them even more critical 
from a systemic risk perspective. First, given the 
bilateral nature of trading, there is no central place 
where OTC trades are captured and handled. The 
effective monitoring of market activities is therefore 
more difﬁ  cult and effective risk management may 
FSR14_RUSSO.indd   102 FSR14_RUSSO.indd   102 13/07/2010   09:11:39 13/07/2010   09:11:39ARTICLES
Daniela Russo: “OTC derivatives: ﬁ  nancial stability challenges and responses from authorities”
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability ￿ July 2010  103
Chart 2






























be hampered by different or even inconsistent 
practices. Second, OTC derivatives are instruments 
tailored to the needs of the relevant counterparties. 
Accordingly, their risk proﬁ  le can be very unique 
and their implications for the overall distribution 
of risks across the ﬁ  nancial system can be difﬁ  cult 
to determine. Third, trading volumes have reached 
very large levels, with an enormous growth rate 
especially during recent years. For example, between 
June 2005 and June 2008 the overall market size 
doubled, reaching approximately USD 684 trillion in 
June 2008. In some market segments, growth was 
even more pronounced. For example, during the 
same period the nominal amounts outstanding of 
credit default swaps (CDSs) more than quintupled, 
from about USD 10 trillion to about USD 57 trillion. 
The turmoil brought about a ﬁ  rst period of decline 
in market volumes since 1998, although they 
stabilised at high levels: in June 2009 total market 
volumes and CDS volumes stood at USD 600 trillion 
and USD 36 trillion respectively. While the actual 
payment ﬂ  ows at risk, approximated by gross market 
values,1 amounted to only USD 25 trillion for all OTC 
derivatives and USD 3 trillion for CDS, these are still 
very substantial ﬁ  gures especially in view of the 
particularly high degree of market concentration 
and interconnectedness.2 Charts 1 and 2 illustrate 
the development of OTC derivatives markets.
2| POLICY PRIORITIES: 
  STRENGTHENED RESILIENCY 
  AND TRANSPARENCY
The ﬁ  nancial crisis has brought OTC derivatives to the 
forefront of regulatory attention. The near-collapse 
of Bear Stearns in March 2008, the default of 
Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 and the 
bail-out of the American International Group (AIG) 
on 16 September 2008 highlighted the signiﬁ  cant 
ﬁ  nancial stability implications of OTC derivatives 
markets in general and CDS markets in particular. 
In particular, the case of Lehman Brothers allows 
to clearly illustrating the relevance of adequate 
and resilient infrastructure. Lehman was a global 
company with business in a large number of markets 
across the globe. However the effects of the Lehman 
default were not the same in the different markets 
where the group was an active player.
In OTC derivatives markets, Lehman Investment Bank 
was both a major player and a reference entity. At the 
occurrence of the default, no precise information was 
available about the volumes of the concerned trades 
and the net amounts that would be lost on Lehman’s 
own CDS obligations or be required to settle contracts 
referencing Lehman’s debt. Given the high degree 
of market concentration and the corresponding size 
of the potential exposures of some major ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, the possible repercussions for the already 
troubled banking system and strained market liquidity 
were deemed to be significant. The absence of 
established cash settlement procedures in the event 
of the failure of a major market player and reference 
entity further exacerbated the situation. Indeed, 
there were strong indications that this uncertainty, 
originating in a relatively small market segment, 
affected ﬁ  nancial markets more broadly, including the 
money market where it contributed to precautionary 
hording behaviour of market participants. The 
corresponding market turbulences only abated once 
the main CDS dealers had netted their outstanding 
positions relating to CDS contracts to which Lehman 
had been counterparty and had determined in a joint 
1  Gross market values represent the replacement costs of existing OTC derivatives contracts, without taking into account existing legally enforceable bilateral netting 
agreements or the collateralisation of positions.
2  See ECB (August 2009).
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auction the recovery rate for the cash settlement 
of CDS contracts referencing Lehman. More than 
one month after Lehman’s default a total of about 
USD 5 billion in net payments were made in settling 
these positions.3 The market data presented in the 
above charts 1 and 2, highlighting declining overall 
market volumes accompanied with higher risk metrics 
in terms of gross market values during the second 
half of 2008, provide an indication of the relevance 
of the Lehman’s default for OTC derivatives markets. 
In foreign exchange and repo markets, Lehman was 
also major counterparty, acted as issuer of ﬁ  nancial 
instruments (including of various structured 
products), as well as a settlement agent, custodian 
and/or collateral provider. However, contrary to the 
situation on CDS markets, on these other affected 
ﬁ  nancial markets, ﬁ  nancial infrastructures were 
available to manage the Lehman default. While 
central counterparties (CCPs) needed to carefully 
assess and disentangle a large number of positions 
of Lehman (not uncommonly intra-group in nature) 
and to unwind, hedge, liquidate and transfer millions 
of positions of their participants and clients at a scale 
of complexity never experienced before, they were 
generally able to complete these operations largely 
without losses.4 The beneﬁ  ts of ﬁ  nancial market 
infrastructures in dealing with the Lehman case also 
were apparent in the foreign exchange market, where 
the ability of Continuous Linked Settlement System –
CLS – to continue to settle the positions of Lehman 
effectively limited the impact of the insolvency. 
Overall, the solid performance of ﬁ  nancial market 
infrastructures in managing Lehman’s default 
contrasted starkly with the respective disruptive 
bilateral processes in CDS markets, notably due to 
the absence of adequate market infrastructures for 
these products.
In the light of these events, there is a need to address 
two main weaknesses of OTC derivatives markets. 
While during the ﬁ  nancial crisis these were most 
evident with regard to CDS, there is broad agreement 
that the underlying structural deﬁ  ciencies affect OTC 
derivatives markets in general and therefore need 
to be tackled across asset classes.
First, the transparency of OTC derivatives markets 
must be enhanced. Given the bilateral nature of OTC 
derivatives transactions, it is much more difﬁ  cult for 
both public authorities (such as central banks, market 
surveillance authorities and banking supervisors) and 
market participants to adequately monitor the building 
up of exposures and to assess potential risks for ﬁ  nancial 
stability and market integrity than it is the case for 
exchange-traded and/or centrally-cleared ﬁ  nancial 
transactions. This hampers the ability of both public 
authorities and market participants to take timely 
action in response to emerging ﬁ  nancial vulnerabilities. 
Furthermore, the opaque nature of OTC derivatives 
markets hampers effective risk management and also 
gives rise to uncertainty, with a signiﬁ  cant potential 
for an erosion of market conﬁ  dence namely during 
distressed market conditions.  
Second, risk management for OTC derivatives must 
be improved. The ﬁ  nancial turbulences highlighted 
that market participants had insufﬁ  cient capabilities 
for measuring and monitoring counterparty and 
liquidity risks, especially in view of the particular 
complexity of OTC derivatives products, the high 
degree of interconnectedness among major ﬁ  nancial 
institutions, and the more limited liquidity of 
these markets, as evidenced in the sizable losses 
incurred during the Lehman default. Differences 
in risk management across ﬁ  nancial institutions 
created additional difﬁ  culties. Furthermore, lack of 
standardisation and automation of processes created 
signiﬁ  cant operational risks and processing backlogs, 
adding to market uncertainty.
3| TOOLS: SOUND MARKET 
  INFRASTRUCTURES, IMPROVED 
  BILATERAL RISK MANAGEMENT 
  AND COOPERATION 
  AMONG AUTHORITIES
3|1  Sound market infrastructures
CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES
The use of central counterparties (CCPs) for OTC 
derivatives brings a number of signiﬁ  cant beneﬁ  ts 
3  See Feder (I.), Frankel (A.) and Gyntelberg (J.) (2008).
4  See CCP12 (2009).
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as compared to the settlement of gross transactions 
or bilateral clearing. First, CCPs’ risk management 
is particularly robust, based on several highly 
sophisticated and technically advanced tools to 
monitor and manage risks (e.g. membership, 
margining and collateral requirements), including 
tools for loss sharing in case of the potential default 
of one its members, which are obviously not available 
in case of risk management by banks. Second, by 
interposing itself as buyer to every seller and seller 
to every buyer among its members, CCPs reduce the 
direct bilateral interconnectedness between major 
ﬁ  nancial institutions, thereby providing an important 
contribution to limiting contagion risk in the ﬁ  nancial 
system. Third, central clearing has a positive effect 
on market liquidity as a result of multilateral netting 
which reduces the number of settlements as well 
as associated risks and costs. Fourth, using a CCP 
increases operational efﬁ  ciency as it centralises 
critical functions such as the calculation of positions, 
risk management, and settlement of margins and 
other form of collateral and payments. Finally, central 
clearing can help to solve some of the problems 
resulting from information gaps that may impede 
fully informed risk management and may undermine 
market conﬁ  dence.
Despite the pronounced beneﬁ  ts of CCPs for all 
stakeholders, their services do come at a cost for 
their users. Private sector efforts alone are therefore 
insufﬁ  cient to ensure the adequate use of these 
infrastructures, but need be complemented by 
regulatory requirements and incentives. Public 
sector action is also needed to ensure the safety and 
soundness of CCPs, given the nature these entities 
to concentrate counterparty risk and their according 
systemic relevance. This requires the establishment 
of robust legal frameworks and close regulation 
and oversight. The respective measures should be 
consistent on a cross-border basis to pre-empt scope 
for regulatory arbitrage and a potential erosion of CCP 
risk management standards through a competitive 
race to the bottom among providers. Finally, the 
various authorities with competence for CCPs, 
namely securities regulators and central banking 
overseers, should cooperate very closely in order 
to fulﬁ  l their responsibilities in an effective and 
consistent manner. 
In view of the systemic relevance of CCPs, 
another important point is to ensure that their 
operation is fully embedded within the wider 
ﬁ  nancial stability setting, which is still organised 
predominantly along national lines. In this context 
the Eurosystem attaches great importance to its 
long-standing position, as ﬁ  rst formulated in its 
September 2001 Policy line on the consolidation 
of central counterparty clearing and subsequently 
reaffirmed by the Eurosystem’s Governing 
Council,5 that the infrastructure for the clearing of 
euro-denominated securities and derivatives should 
be located in the euro area. This requirement is 
critical to ensure effective Eurosystem oversight 
of euro CCPs as well as to monitor and address the 
potentially pronounced implications of such CCPs 
for euro area market liquidity especially during 
distressed market conditions, particularly in view 
of the corresponding repercussions for the effective 
exercise of the Eurosystem’s core responsibilities for 
monetary policy and ﬁ  nancial stability. It is even 
more important in view of the role of the euro as 
a major currency of denomination of OTC derivatives 
contracts.6 The importance of monetary policy 
concerns relating to CCPs were also recognised by 
the Ecoﬁ  n Council in December 2009.
Against this background, the case of the UK-based 
ICE Clear Europe raises some issues. Since its 
launch in July 2009, this CCP has cleared the vast 
majority of euro-denominated CDSs. Moreover, only 
one of its direct participants is incorporated in the 
euro area, which implies that for the clearing of 
euro-denominated CDS euro area banks need to get 
access to a CCP located outside the euro area through 
clearing members who are also located offshore. 
This situation gives rise to Eurosystem concerns as 
the Eurosystem does not have any direct tools either 
to access the information necessary to determine 
whether ICE Clear Europe poses ﬁ  nancial stability 
risks to the euro area or to ensure that the CCP 
would take appropriate measures to address possible 
Eurosystem’s concerns in this regard. For example 
it is currently unclear whether ICE Clear Europe 
has appropriate arrangements to address its 
potential liquidity needs in extreme but plausible 
situations, notably in view of its predominantly 
euro-denominated business and its offshore location. 
5  See the related Governing Council decisions of 19 December 2008 and 16 July 2009.
6  See ECB (September 2009).
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TRADE REPOSITORIES
Trade repositories (TRs), registries of OTC derivatives 
trades, provide an effective tool to mitigate the 
inherent opacity of OTC derivatives markets through 
the centralised storage of information on trading 
transactions, dealer positions and prices. To the 
extent that TRs achieve comprehensive coverage of 
certain products, they can provide a timely overview 
of the build-up and distribution of exposures in the 
relevant markets. In this way, TRs support enhanced 
risk management of ﬁ  nancial institutions and market 
infrastructures active in the ﬁ  eld of OTC derivatives, 
facilitate the effective supervision and oversight of 
these entities, and support strengthened market 
discipline. They also enable central banks to establish 
early-warning mechanisms for emerging risks to 
ﬁ  nancial stability and facilitate the work of market 
surveillance authorities to safeguard market integrity.   
Given the importance of comprehensive data 
coverage, reporting of all trades to TRs should be 
mandatory. Furthermore, as in the case of CCPs, 
globally consistent measures are needed to ensure 
the safety and soundness of TRs, given the growing 
reliance of market participants, infrastructures and 
public authorities (such as central banks, securities 
regulators, market regulators and banking supervisors) 
on the accuracy and availability of these data. At the 
same time, it is critical to ensure the unfettered access 
of all stakeholders to the information stored in TRs, 
in line with their responsibilities and information 
needs. Possible global contract coverage of TRs 
could only be acceptable if the effectiveness of such 
information-sharing is ensured on a global basis; any 
possible remaining obstacles in this regard should 
be removed as a matter of urgency. An important 
further requirement for global trade repositories 
is the establishment of appropriate cooperative 
oversight arrangements7 in order to provide sufﬁ  cient 
assurance to the concerned foreign central banks 
of issue, overseers and regulators regarding the 
well-functioning and resilience of the concerned TR 
and to enable them to address possible concerns in 
this regard. 
3|2  Improved bilateral risk management
Careful attention also needs to be assigned to risk 
management requirements for OTC derivatives that will 
continue to be cleared bilaterally. While the Eurosystem 
shares the widely held view that OTC derivatives should 
be centrally cleared to the greatest extent possible, it 
has to be acknowledged that certain products are not 
suitable for central clearing, e.g. owing to insufﬁ  cient 
product standardisation, market liquidity or availability 
of robust prices. In fact, from a ﬁ  nancial stability 
perspective it may not even be desirable to submit 
100% of clearing-eligible trades to central clearing. In 
particular, a CCP may assess that it is not in a position 
to manage the resulting risks appropriately, for example 
if it has not sufﬁ  cient expertise in a certain product or 
it may not wish to accept the concerned counterparties 
to the transaction as participants because they do not 
comply with the CCPs’ membership requirements. 
Furthermore, the introduction of a clearing obligation 
should not expose the CCP to a sudden and abrupt 
increase in volumes to clear that it cannot adequately 
handle with its existing capacities. 
COLLATERALISATION AND CAPITAL CHARGES
Due to the more bespoke and opaque nature of 
non-CCP suitable trades, it is more difficult to 
determine, monitor and manage the corresponding 
risks and bilateral risk management must therefore 
be highly robust. Stringent risk controls for bilaterally 
cleared trades will also provide incentives for 
counterparties to use CCP services whenever 
available and feasible. 
Against this background, bilaterally cleared trades 
should be subject to collateral requirements that are 
at least as sound as the risk controls typically applied 
by CCPs. While the use of collateral agreements – 
largely based on the ISDA Master Agreement and 
its Credit Support annex – increased during the past 
decade, it is still not comprehensive. According to 
industry estimates,8 70% of all OTC transactions were 
7  The main references are the principles for international cooperative oversight, set forth in Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Central bank oversight 
of payment and settlement systems, May 2005.
8 ISDA  (2010).
FSR14_RUSSO.indd   106 FSR14_RUSSO.indd   106 13/07/2010   09:11:39 13/07/2010   09:11:39ARTICLES
Daniela Russo: “OTC derivatives: ﬁ  nancial stability challenges and responses from authorities”
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 14 – Derivatives – Financial innovation and stability ￿ July 2010  107
subject to collateral agreements in 2009. One key 
objective will therefore be to further enhance the 
coverage of bilateral collateralisation. In addition, the 
effectiveness of the respective arrangements needs 
to be stepped up. The ﬁ  nancial crisis highlighted for 
example deﬁ  ciencies in the frequency of collateral 
(re-)valuation, the timeliness of margin settlements, 
and the stringency of the underlying risk assumptions 
(e.g. regarding the liquidity of collateral under stressed 
market conditions). Similarly, owing to different 
collateral management practices and divergent 
interpretations of the ISDA Master Agreement, 
disputes among counterparties are not uncommon, 
leading to uncertainty regarding the reliability of 
bilateral agreements. There are also operational 
challenges relating to limits in the automation and 
scalability of collateral management processes.
Appropriate capital charges for counterparty credit 
risk exposures are an important complement to 
adequate bilateral collateralisation. Given their higher 
inherent risk, bilaterally cleared OTC derivatives 
should generally be subject to higher capital 
requirements than centrally cleared transactions. 
REPORTING
As centrally cleared trades, all bilaterally cleared 
trades should be reported to trade repositories to 
provide enhanced transparency on these exposures. 
In line with existing reporting requirements for 
securities, it would also seem useful to enhance 
post-trade reporting to regulators to facilitate an 
in-depth assessment of prudential supervisors and 
market surveillance authorities. 
PORTFOLIO COMPRESSION, OPERATIONAL 
IMPROVEMENTS AND STANDARDISATION
Additional important measures to strengthen bilateral 
risk management relate to portfolio compression. 
Portfolio compression refers to the multilateral 
termination of economically redundant trades, while 
maintaining participants’ net positions. In this way, it 
is possible to reduce the number of outstanding trades 
and the associated counterparty and operational 
risk as well as to limit the overall complexity of OTC 
derivatives portfolios for the beneﬁ  ts of both market 
participants and public authorities. Furthermore, 
improvements of operational processes are needed 
to further expand the automated trading and 
post-trading of OTC derivatives to enhance the 
efﬁ  ciency and safety of the respective processes 
and to address the possible risk of the emergence of 
processing backlogs and the resulting uncertainties 
as they emerged during the ﬁ  nancial crisis. 
A ﬁ  nal important strand of work relates to initiatives 
to foster the standardisation of product and contract 
terms. Increased standardisation is not only 
a prerequisite for further progress in bilateral risk 
management through portfolio compression and 
more automated processing, but is also a key measure 
with a view to extending the population of potentially 
centrally clearable trades. 
3|3 Cooperation  between 
CCP regulators and overseers 
and banking supervisors 
For three main reasons, regulators and overseers of 
CCPs for OTC derivatives should closely cooperate 
with prudential supervisors of the financial 
institutions – notably the large cross-border banks – 
that deal with these ﬁ  nancial instruments. 
First, the major OTC derivatives dealers are typically 
the largest participants of OTC derivatives CCPs. 
Adequate prudential requirements for the OTC 
derivatives business of banks are therefore essential 
not only to ensure the safety and soundness of the 
banks on a stand-alone basis, but also to rule out 
possible risks for the stability of the CCP. It should 
also be noted that such risks would most likely have 
implications for more than one CCP given that the 
major OTC derivatives dealers are typically members 
of several CCPs, owing to the limitations in inter-CCP 
interoperability.
Second, based on their status as general clearing 
members of OTC derivatives CCPs, banks may provide 
CCP-like services to smaller ﬁ  nancial institutions 
which cannot or do not wish to access the CCP 
directly (e.g. because of the stringent nature of the 
CCP’s membership requirements). Indeed, this is 
frequently the case in OTC derivatives markets 
given their high degree of market concentration and 
their correspondingly tiered nature. It is therefore 
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critical to ensure the functional equivalence of 
risk management requirements for centrally and 
bilaterally cleared transactions in order to pre-empt 
possible scope for regulatory arbitrage. For instance, 
if prudential rules for banks were less stringent than 
the rules for CCPs, there would be a risk that most 
of the clearing would be done by general clearing 
members rather than by CCPs, on the basis of 
lower risk management standards. More in general, 
functional equivalence is indispensable to foster the 
use of CCPs for the clearing of OTC derivatives and to 
reduce in this way also the direct exposures between 
major ﬁ  nancial institutions.
Third, coordination and information-sharing between 
CCP regulators and overseers and banking supervisors 
is needed to ensure a comprehensive mitigation of 
systemic risk arising from OTC derivatives without 
possible regulatory gaps and loopholes as well as 
to appropriately reﬂ  ect the speciﬁ  c risks arising 
from different clearing arrangements. As set out 
above, bilaterally cleared contracts are more likely 
to generate considerable frictions in OTC derivatives 
markets, namely in case of wider ﬁ  nancial market 
turbulences. Indeed, such frictions could be larger 
than the share of the involved contract volumes may 
suggest and could also affect CCPs active in this ﬁ  eld.
4| CURRENT INITIATIVES 
In line with the respective G20 mandate to urgently 
strengthen the robustness of OTC derivatives markets9 
several public sector initiatives are underway to 
foster the use of sound CCPs and TRs, to enhance 
bilateral risk management, and to step up cooperation 
between CCP regulators and overseers and central 
bank supervisors.
4|1 CPSS-IOSCO  international 
standards
International standards, jointly formulated by 
central banking overseers and securities regulators, 
provide a key reference point for efforts to ensure 
the soundness of OTC derivatives CCPs and TRs.
Many complex risk characteristics are unique for OTC 
derivatives products and were not fully discussed 
in the 2004 report of the existing Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems – International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (CPSS-IOSCO) 
Recommendations for CCPs (RCCP). Consequently, 
applying the RCCP to newly established OTC 
derivatives CCPs has involved a considerable degree 
of interpretation and judgment. Similarly, for TRs 
no international guidance currently exists at all, 
although these novel infrastructures are gaining an 
increasingly prominent role. The CPSS and IOSCO 
therefore recently published draft guidance on 
the application of the RCCP to CCPs clearing OTC 
derivatives as well as a set of factors that should be 
considered by trade repositories in designing and 
operating their services and by relevant authorities 
in regulating and overseeing them.10
Key issues highlighted in draft guidance for CCPs 
relate for example to the need for risk measurement 
and management tools and default management 
arrangements that are commensurate with the 
inherently more complex nature of OTC derivatives 
products and the more limited liquidity and 
transparency of OTC derivatives markets as well as 
for appropriate arrangements to ensure that decisions 
regarding the determination of the clearing eligibility 
of products is made on risk-based considerations only 
and may not be compromised by potential conﬂ  icts 
of interest at the CCP. 
The CPSS-IOSCO report also proposes for the ﬁ  rst 
time a set of objectives for ensuring resilience of 
trade repositories. In particular, the CPSS and IOSCO 
underline the importance of measures to ensure the 
operational reliability and resiliency of TRs as well 
as for the safeguarding and timely record keeping 
of data to ensure the continuous availability and 
accuracy of information stored in TRs. Other major 
concerns include the need for open access to the 
information and for well-founded legal frameworks 
and adequate regulatory and oversight arrangements 
for TRs.
9  The G20 leaders, at their September 2009 summit in Pittsburgh, concluded: “All standardised OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or electronic 
trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties by end-2012 at the latest. OTC derivative contracts should be reported to trade 
repositories. Non-centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital requirements. We ask the FSB and its relevant members to assess regularly 
implementation and whether it is sufﬁ  cient to improve transparency in the derivatives markets, mitigate systemic risk, and protect against market abuse.”
10 See  http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss89.htm and http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss90.htm.
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The proposed guidance for OTC derivatives CCPs and 
trade repositories forms part of a more comprehensive 
review of the existing international standards 
for payment, clearing and settlement systems.11 
This review, launched by the CPSS and IOSCO in 
February 2010,12 aims to update the standards in the 
light of the experiences since their adoption and some 
speciﬁ  c lessons relating to the functioning of market 
infrastructures during the ﬁ  nancial market turmoil.13 
The general review of the standards will address a 
number of issues that are highly relevant not only 
for OTC derivatives market infrastructures but for 
all critical market infrastructure. In principle, all 
ﬁ  nancial market infrastructure (and not only CCPs 
and TRs) should be subject to the same requirements 
to the extent that they have to properly manage 
the same risks. For instance, the CPSS and IOSCO 
intend to propose a new standard for liquidity risk 
management. While this is an important issue for 
markets of comparatively less depth and liquidity, 
such as OTC derivatives markets, the ﬁ  nancial crisis 
highlighted that liquidity resilience is key also for 
infrastructure serving “liquid” markets, partly because 
of potential spill-over effects from one market to the 
other and partly because unexpected behavior of 
critical players or lack of adequate infrastructure can 
create artiﬁ  cial liquidity problems. Similarly, the CPSS 
and IOSCO intend to strengthen the requirements for 
adapting risk management measures and regulatory 
and oversight arrangements to the cross-border 
nature and ﬁ  nancial stability implications of ﬁ  nancial 
market infrastructures.
4|2  European market infrastructure 
legislation (EMIL)
In line with the G20 mandate, and as other major 
jurisdictions, the European Union is currently in the 
process of developing legislation to (i) ensure that 
the vast majority of CCP-eligible OTC derivatives 
contracts will be cleared via authorised CCPs; (ii) 
specify reporting obligations to trade repositories and 
as well as safeguards for access to relevant information 
held by trade repositories; and (iii) establish common 
regulatory requirements for these infrastructures. 
Concrete measures will be set forth in the European 
Market Infrastructure Legislation (EMIL)14 for which 
the European Commission intends to issue a draft 
proposal by mid 2010.
One of the main elements of EMIL will be to determine 
the appropriate scope for mandatory central clearing. 
It will be important to strike an appropriate balance 
between two main considerations in this regard. 
On the one hand, as mentioned above, any such 
requirements should not impact on the ability of 
CCPs to appropriately manage the corresponding 
risks. Any central clearing obligation should also be 
applied with a fair degree of reason and ﬂ  exibility so 
as to avoid costs which are not justiﬁ  ed by systemic 
risk mitigation. On the other hand, processes must 
be in place to ensure that CCP’s decisions regarding 
the eligibility for clearing of products are grounded 
on risk-based considerations only and may not be 
compromised by potential conﬂ  icts of interest at the 
CCP, including for example through close scrutiny of 
the respective decisions by regulators and overseers 
and appropriate corporate governance arrangements.   
There are strong indications that the progress 
towards the use central clearing for central clearing 
has been excessively slow so far and that regulatory 
requirements are needed to speed up the process. 
According to some industry estimates, only around 5% 
of outstanding OTC credit derivatives, 35% of interest 
rate derivatives and 15-20% of equity derivatives 
are currently centrally cleared, although a further 
80-90% of OTC credit derivatives, 50% of interest 
rate derivatives and 55-60% of equity derivatives 
would be sufﬁ  ciently standardised to allow for their 
central clearing. While it is clear that such estimates 
should be interpreted with some caution, given 
existing data limitations and considering also that 
11  Three sets of standards are involved, namely the 2001 Core principles for systemically important payment systems, the 2001 Recommendations for securities 
settlement systems, and the 2004 Recommendations for central counterparties.
12  http://www.bis.org/press/p100202.htm.
13  For a European perspective on these lessons, see ECB (2010).
14  In addition, EMIL aims to promote progress towards a more integrated CCP interface for the single ﬁ  nancial market through the adoption of common rules for 
CCPs for all ﬁ  nancial instruments they deal with and through the removal of barriers preventing links between market infrastructures, subject to the appropriate 
management of risks arising from these arrangements. Up to now, there has been no legislation or binding regulation in place for ﬁ  nancial market infrastructures at 
European level to address ﬁ  nancial stability concerns. There are only initiatives and recommendations that are non-binding such as the ESCB-CESR recommendations 
for Securities Settlement Systems and CCPs as endorsed last year aimed at promoting the safety and soundness of clearing and settlement systems in the European 
Union. While all relevant authorities have expressed the intention to apply the recommendations in principle, there is no formalised institutional framework for 
their consistent implementation in practice. Regulatory arbitrage can still not be ruled out.
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central clearing depends not only on sufficient 
product standardisation, there is clearly scope for 
improvement. 
EMIL also aims to promote progress towards a more 
integrated CCP interface for the single ﬁ  nancial 
market in the European Union through the ﬁ  rst-time 
adoption of a common EU passport for CCPs for 
all ﬁ  nancial instruments they deal with.15 Against 
this background, and in light of the Eurosystem’s 
concerns regarding the implied risks of the use of 
offshore CCPs highlighted earlier, EMIL should also 
ensure the effective involvement of central banks 
of issue in the authorisation of CCPs that may wish 
expand their activities across the European Union. 
4|3  Coordination between EMIL 
and the work of CPSS-IOSCO
The work on international standards for OTC 
derivatives CCPs and TRs and the development of 
EMIL are closely interrelated. The two initiatives 
address the same type of infrastructures and risks 
and should therefore be closely aligned to ensure the 
overall congruence of public authorities’ approaches 
vis-à-vis the concerned infrastructures, particularly 
in view of the global nature of OTC derivatives 
markets. However, the two initiatives differ in terms 
of the legal enforcement and level of granularity 
of the respective requirements. The CPSS-IOSCO 
recommendations could provide a useful tool through 
which legislation is enforced in a globally consistent 
way across jurisdictions. Indeed, requirements with 
a higher level of granularity would require higher 
ﬂ  exibility to quickly adapt or change them over time. 
The CPSS-IOSCO standards should therefore serve as 
a reference point for legislators around the globe when 
deﬁ  ning requirements for OTC derivatives CCPs and 
TRs to ensure broad congruence of their frameworks. 
In particular, in view of the overlapping timetables 
for the finalisation of the revised international 
standards (scheduled for the ﬁ  rst half of 2011) and the 
legislative reforms (with possible adoption in some 
major jurisdictions such as the United States already 
by the end of 2010) and considering also the rapidly 
evolving nature and ongoing structural changes in 
OTC derivatives markets, national legislation should 
be also sufﬁ  ciently ﬂ  exible to allow for further 
global coordination in the speciﬁ  cation of the main 
technical requirements during the implementation 
phase, which could again be supported by the CPSS 
and IOSCO. Against this background, the proposal in 
current US draft bills to explicitly allow the competent 
authorities (SEC and CFTC) to use the CPSS-IOSCO 
recommendations in implementing the forthcoming 
US OTC derivatives legislation would seem to go into 
the appropriate direction.
4|4 Cooperation  between 
CCP regulators and overseers 
and banking supervisors
As set out above, regulators and overseers of 
CCPs should cooperate with banking supervisors 
to safeguard consistently high standards for the 
management of risks arising from OTC derivatives 
and to achieve a comprehensive overview and 
mitigation of systemic risk in OTC derivatives 
markets. To this avail, the competent standard-setting 
bodies – the CPSS, IOSCO and the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) – are engaged 
in a close dialogue to align their requirements. 
In parallel, competent central banks, regulators and 
banking supervisors are cooperating in the global 
OTC Derivatives Regulators’ Forum to promote 
convergent approaches and information-sharing. 
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE CPSS, IOSCO 
AND BASEL COMMITTEE
A ﬁ  rst strand of work relates to the provisions in 
draft banking rules to apply a zero risk weight and 
capital charges for trades that are cleared through 
CCPs, provided that the CCPs comply with certain 
requirements. The CPSS, IOSCO and Basel Committee 
are discussing how to ensure consistency between 
the respective requirements imposed by banking 
supervisors and the approach and logic taken by the 
CPSS-IOSCO recommendations with regard to CCPs.
15  At present, only the non-binding ESCB-CESR recommendations for securities clearing and settlement systems are in place.
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In this context, it is important to note that the 
CPSS-IOSCO’s philosophy and actual approach allow 
for a nuanced assessment of CCPs by distinguishing 
between full compliance, broad compliance and 
partial compliance. An oversimpliﬁ  ed translation 
of a CCP’s compliance with any regulatory standards 
into capital requirements should therefore be 
avoided.  Moreover, CPSS-IOSCO underlines that the 
safety of a CCP should not be assessed on the basis 
of individual risk controls, but of the right mix of all 
risk mitigation measures. Finally, when calculating 
the exposure of banks vis-à-vis CCPs, it is important 
to carefully consider the speciﬁ  c loss-sharing rules 
that the CCP has in place. In this context it may not 
be desirable from a ﬁ  nancial stability perspective to 
consider margins more favourably than default fund 
arrangements. Indeed, the absence of default funds 
or other mutualisation instruments might result, in 
the event of a serious crisis, in a higher impact of 
adverse events and concentrated losses in a smaller 
number of participants, possibly reducing the ability 
of the CCP to act as a circuit-breaker for transmission 
of contagion. 
A second strand of work relates to identifying 
appropriate and globally consistent measures to 
promote greater use of standardised OTC derivatives, 
implement mandatory central clearing as well as, 
where appropriate, exchange or electronic trading 
requirements. This assessment is conducted by 
a joint working group mandated by the Financial 
Stability Board. In addition to the CPSS, IOSCO, 
and the Basel Committee, the group also includes 
a number of national securities regulators, central 
banks, and banking supervisors and the European 
Central Bank. The group is expected to conclude its 
work in the fourth quarter of 2010.
OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATORS’ FORUM
Since January 2009, central banks, securities regulators, 
banking supervisors and market surveillance authorities 
have met periodically at global level to exchange views 
and share information on developments related to 
CCPs and TRs for OTC derivatives, initially focusing 
on CDS. Based on this work, in September 2009 
the OTC Derivatives Regulators’ Forum was formed 
to provide regulators with a means to regularly 
cooperate, exchange views and share information on 
CCPs and TRs for all OTC derivatives. The Forum has 
also worked to articulate the information needs of 
public authorities and market participants from OTC 
derivatives CCPs and TRs and to develop common 
reporting templates and formats in this regard. In 
addition, the Forum has assisted the establishment 
of cooperative oversight arrangements with regard to 
individual OTC derivatives infrastructures. 
The Forum is a purely informal body without any 
binding decision-making capacity or authority for the 
regulation and oversight of individual infrastructures 
of its own. Instead, it derives its strength from each 
participant’s independent and voluntary decision 
to participate in and support the work of the Forum 
and from promoting common awareness of issues 
and possible approaches to manage them.
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